Verbum Vincet. War rhetoric in Rwanda, Syria and Ukraine

By Julien Dreveton

Verbum Vincet

« Verbum Vincet », « The Word Will Conquer » is the 4th Psychological Operations Group of the United States Army's maxim [1]. One can indeed conquer by the word, war rhetoric being part of armed conflicts. Political sciences and social psychology help us understand to what extent communication and propaganda have concrete action on the human's mind. Concepts such as elite activation of identity and rewriting of the war narrative can be seen in Rwanda (1994), Syria (2011) and Ukraine (2022). These three cases represent a spectrum of political violence (a genocide, a civil war, an invasion) and involve similar rhetoric mechanisms. Inter alia, violence against civilians will be a this paper's common thread.

Elite activation of identity represents the way elites weaponize identity in order to reach and hold to power. They select and activate it to build and maintain support within the population against a scapegoat. On the other hand, rewriting history helps the construction of a narrative that is favourable to a side or another. Analysing war rhetoric is therefore crucial to understand what underpin speeches. We will explain how the dehumanisation of the enemy and the justification of war can alter the human mind, having direct geopolitical consequences.

War rhetoric in Rwanda : following the path of genocide

During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, eight hundred thousand people - mainly Tutsis - were killed in three months. The division between Hutus and Tutsis is in fact a colonial construct. Classifying the « Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa identities » comes from a 1933 Belgian administrative procedure [2]. It determined an ethnic division based on class. The wealthier and livestock owners were assigned the Tutsi ethnicity, whereas the mass of peasants were called Hutus. These identities were arbitrary and depended upon the number of cattle.

Elite activation of identity used colonial narratives in its discourses. The practices used by the state, in order to survive, were underpinned by the identity created during the colonial era. Prunier showed to what extent the colonial theory of « the Tutsis coming from outside Rwanda to rule the country because they are in fact closer to the Europeans » led to substantial political consequences. During the 1960s, Hutus were talking about democracy as a system where the Hutu « people » had legitimacy over the Tutsi « aristocracy » that was not even coming from the mainland [3]. From this point of view, a legitimate democratic government would then be Hutu. A part of Hutu elites used this ideology in order to convince the Hutu peasants to participate in the genocide [4].

The particular way of conceptualising democracy that Gérard Prunier is bringing forward can be illustrated by a psychological mechanism found by Omar Macdoom. He notes the « boundary activation » mechanism, meaning that the perceived potential threat hardens the boundary between groups and turn the conflict into an ethnic one [5]. The individuals go back to their group trenches and the enemies become ethnic enemies. This can be observed with the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), the major tool of propaganda when it came to discriminate against the Tutsis. Before the genocide, the RTLM was only referencing to the Tutsis as « Tutsis ». After the first killings, the radio speakers started to use the ethnic term of « inyenzi » or « cockroaches » [6]. These terms were already used in the 1960s in order to refer to the so-called Tutsi foreigners [7], during the premisses of the ideology praising for a « Hutu democracy » [8]. Therefore, identities constructed by colonisers started a political ideology that encouraged civil conflict. The terms used by the propaganda also triggered another psychological concept : « out-group homogenization », the belief that there is no diversity out of the group, that each and every outsider is a potential enemy [9].

The binary model left by Europeans suited the genocidal strategy. One has to remember that the « Ten Stages of Genocide », according to Genocide Watch, are : classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination, and denial [10]. The colonial constructs had already accomplished the two, and even the three first steps one could say. At a time of political survival, the Hutu elite could then activate the followings, one after the other. Propaganda, and radio in particular, blamed the victims and constructed a scenario to justify the ongoing genocide [11]. Furthermore, calling Tutsis « cockroaches » participated in their dehumanisation. Psychology scholars have shown that « group absolution » (anonymity and less remorse when killing in a group) is made possible when killers deny their victims' humanity [12]. It happened to be the case. In Rwanda, the psychological effects of war rhetoric increased political violence : speeches followed the genocidal steps.

War rhetoric in Syria : hidden tactics and violence against civilians

In Syria, Bashar al-Assad allies (e.g. Russia and Iran) used more indiscriminate violence due to a public opinion mechanism. They waited until the last moment for their domestic public opinion to think that they were forced to rescue their ally [13]. They did so in order to justify their military action in front of their domestic public opinion, as well as in the eyes of the international community. Iran and the Hezbollah armed group said they were rescuing a chia ally under sunni threat for instance [14].

The Islamic Republic of Iran narrative consisted in the instrumentalisation of the so called « defensive » jihad. According to the Q'ran, the idea of defensive jihad is as follows: « All permission to defend oneself is given to those who have been attacked » Sura 22, 39-41 [15]. Fighting is legal if one is attacked unjustly or if one is attacked because one is a Muslim. It is in this vein that the Iranians could construct the discourse of the jihad to « protect chia sacred sites in Syria » [16]. Indeed, Article 16 of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution provides for the « formulation of the country's foreign policy on the basis of the criteria of Islam, fraternal commitment to all Muslims and unreserved support for all oppressed peoples (mustad'afan) of the world » [17]. This defensive jihad against « oppressed peoples » makes Iran's proxy wars constitutional. Jihad is explicitly declared to wage war. Pro-Iranian Hezbollah media even underlined the « martyrs » who died while « fulfilling their jihad and religious obligation » against takfirists in Syria [18]. This rhetoric justified the call for international chia militias into the Syrian conflict. Such justification is particularly important. Social psychology of war clearly states the need to convince the fighters that they are fighting for the good in order to keep their perseverance and goodwill [19]. Jihad and martyrdom served this purpose in Syria.

On the other hand, the Kremlin said they were rescuing an ally calling for help as well. Therefore, Russians had not in mind « classic » military operations that would seek to gain positions and eliminate opponents after opponents. In fact, they had in mind to retake the Syrian regime losses at all cost, in order to appear as legitimate saviours [20]. This « we are Bashar al-Assad ultimate saviors » is precisely rewriting history. This is why one saw the use of « punishment » airstrikes that wanted to end the conflict as soon as possible. Mass killings can indeed be carried out in order to « drain the sea » [21]. This means that a government can use extensive indiscriminate violence against the population, with the hope to undermine a guerilla. A substantive example is the battle of Aleppo and its 24,000 civilian casualties. Lost by the regime, the city was taken back in 2016 thanks to the help of Hezbollah, the Iranian state, and particularly Russian forces [22]. The Russian and Syrian authorities proposed « humanitarian corridors » for people to get out of rebel controlled zones before air strikes [23]. Therefore, war justification influenced the conduct of operations. In Syria, the psychological effects of war rhetoric increased political violence by hiding the interveners' true geopolitical tactics and furthering civilian victimisation.

Enduring mechanisms ? The rhetoric of the invasion of Ukraine

The rhetoric of the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation seems to follow a similar path. The act of invasion of the sovereign state in 2022 was justified by a word that is particularly sensitive in the world imagery : « nazi ». Such rhetoric can be divided in two vectors : internal appeal and external appeal. Internal appeal means trying to make the operation appealing to the Russian population. The internal appeal of the « nazi » rhetoric is of course to recall the USSR fighting during World War II. It constitutes a way of encouraging and even galvanising the Russian troops. This discourse also activates the « Russian-USSR » identity vis-à-vis the Russian population, in order to bring the country together. That is why, even though it is proven neo-nazi groups are not major in Ukraine, the word appeared six times in Vladimir Putin 24th of February speech [24]. This vector involving all members of society is crucial. Social psychology of war tells us that no long term action can emerge without the coordination between the political will, the people's will and the army's will [25].

The second vector is external appeal for the international community. That is to say rewriting History to provide for a war narrative in favour of the Russian invasion. Indeed, the « fight against nazis » is seen as a fight for good. This rhetorical tactic is commonly used by foreign leaders to appeal to the western powers. Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia crown prince, used it in 2018 comparing Iran's supreme leader to Hitler [26]. MBS did it in order to convince the westerners to support him against his Iranian enemy. The same argument was recently used in Brazil to call out the exactions of Jair Bolsonaro's police, called a « nazi police » by the opposition [27]. These examples show the use of the « nazi argument » for internal and external appeal.

By calling its enemy « nazi », the Russian Federation constructed a highly violent opponent, justifying a higher use of violence. Undiscriminated bombings and civilian victimization may then be tolerated [28]. The Syrian scenario seems to repeat itself. Though discourses differ, Russian tactics appear to remain the same. Therefore, in Ukraine, the psychological effects of war rhetoric justified political violence once again. Activation of identity and rewriting of History proved to be central to the Rwandan, Syrian and Ukrainian cases. Speeches are weapons of war. Using the example of a genocide illustrated the permanence of such mechanisms whatever the level and organisation of violence. When it comes to Syria and Ukraine, rewriting of history combined with extensive airstrikes constitute a cornerstone to the Russian federation military strategy.

Bibliography

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- Grant K. A. and Kaussler, B. 'The battle of Aleppo: external patrons and the victimization of civilians in civil war, Small Wars & Insurgencies n°31, 2020, pp. 1-33.

- Grossman, D. On Killing. Section IV: Anatomy of a Killing. Hachette, 1995, p. 141-192.

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- Jawad Al-Tamimi, A. 'Hizballah, the Jihah in Syria, and Commemorations in Lebanon', MERIA Journal, 13 July 2015, www.aymennjawad.org/17571/hizballah-the-jihad-in-syria-and-commemorations.

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- Masson, D. 'Le Coran - traduction', Bibliothèque de la PLEIADE, NRF, Éditions Gallimard, 1967.

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[1] U.S Army Special Operation Command. '4th Military Information Support Group' (website), 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20110904035129/https://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20pages/4th%20Military%20Information%20Support%20Group.html.

[2] Hintjens, H. M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1999.

[3] Prunier, G. 'The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide'. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Mcdoom, O. 'The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan Genocide'. International Security n°37. 2012, pp. 119-155.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Prunier, G. 'The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide'. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

[9] Mcdoom, O. 'The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan Genocide'. International Security n°37. 2012, pp. 119-155.

[10] Stanton, G. 'The Ten Stages of Genocide'. Genocide Watch (website), 1996. https://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-stages-of-genocide.

[11] Hintjens, H. M. 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1999.

[12] Grossman, D. On Killing. Section IV: Anatomy of a Killing. Hachette, 1995, p. 141-192.

[13] Grant K. A. and Kaussler, B. 'The battle of Aleppo: external patrons and the victimization of civilians in civil war, Small Wars & Insurgencies n°31, 2020, pp. 1-33.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Masson, D. 'Le Coran - traduction', Bibliothèque de la PLEIADE, NRF, Éditions Gallimard, 1967.

[16] Mauriello, R. and Baron, E. 'L'État islamique et la République islamique d'Iran Jihadisme et jihad au Moyen-Orient', Outre-Terre, vol. 44, no. 3, 2015, pp. 342-353.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Jawad Al-Tamimi, A. 'Hizballah, the Jihah in Syria, and Commemorations in Lebanon', MERIA Journal, 13 July 2015, www.aymennjawad.org/17571/hizballah-the-jihad-in-syria-and-commemorations.

[19] Baechler J. and Bardies L. 'Guerre et Psychologie'. Hermann, L'Homme et la Guerre, 2018, ISBN : 9782705695477.

[20] Grant K. A. and Kaussler, B. 'The battle of Aleppo: external patrons and the victimization of civilians in civil war, Small Wars & Insurgencies n°31, 2020, pp. 1-33.

[21] Valentino, B. Huth, P and and Balch-Lindsay, D. 'Draining the Sea: Mass Killing, Guerrilla Warfare.' International Organization n°58, 2004, pp. 375-407.

[22] Grant K. A. and Kaussler, B. 'The battle of Aleppo: external patrons and the victimization of civilians in civil war, Small Wars & Insurgencies n°31, 2020, pp. 1-33.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Kremlin. 'Address by the President of the Russian Federation' (website) February 24, 2022. https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/67843.

[25] Baechler J. and Bardies L. 'Guerre et Psychologie'. Hermann, L'Homme et la Guerre, 2018, ISBN : 9782705695477.

[26] Saudi crown prince: Iran's supreme leader is 'very much like Hitler' (online video) Al Jazeera English, 2018. https://youtu.be/0LGkwehfi_I.

[27] Après une nouvelle vague de violences policières, le Brésil sous le choc (online video) France 24, 2022. https://youtu.be/BL_agyQ3g04.

[28] United Nations. 'L'ONU confirme plus de 1.563 civils morts en Ukraine' (website) April 2022. https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/04/1117782.

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